Bas C. van Fraassen: Publications, chronological (2022)

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Publications Chronologically Arranged

Articles starting 1962

Articles after 1970

Articles after 1980

Articles after 1985

Articles after 1990

Articles from 1995 on

Articles from 2000 on

For forthcoming papers see manuscripts andabstracts

Articles starting 1962

  1. "Capek on Eternal Recurrence", Journal of Philosophy 59 (1962), pp. 371-375.
  2. "Singular Terms, Truth-Value Gaps and Free Logic", Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966),pp. 481-495.
  3. "The Completeness of Free Logic", Zeitschrift fur Mathem. Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 12 (1966).
  4. "A Note on Bacon's Alternative to Russell", Philosophical Studies 18 (1967), pp. 47-48.
  5. "Meaning Relations among Predicates", Nous l (1967), pp. 160-179.
  6. "On Free Description Theory" (with Karel Lambert) Zeitschrift fur Mathem. Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 13 (1967), 225-240.
  7. "Presupposition, Implication, and Self-Reference", Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968), pp.136-152.
  8. Review: R. Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World, Philosophy of Science 35(1968), pp. 298-299.
  9. "A Topological Proof of the Lowenheim-Skolem, Compactness, and StrongCompleteness Theorems for Free Logic", Zeitschrift fur Math. Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 14 (1968), pp. 245-254.
  10. "Philosophy of Science" (with H. Margenau), Contemporary Philosophy/La Philosophie Contemporaine, ed. R. Klibansky (Firenze, 1968), 25-30.
  11. "Causality" (with H. Margenau) -- Location of (9), pp. 319-328.
  12. Review, R. Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World, Philosophy of Science 35 (1968), pp. 298-299.
  13. "Logical Structure in Plato's Sophist", Metaphysics 22 (1969), pp. 482-498.
  14. "Conventionality in the Axiomatic Foundations of the Special Theory of Relativity", Philosophy of Science 36 (1969), pp. 64-73.
  15. "Meaning Relations and Modalities", Nous 3 (1969), pp. 155-167.
  16. "Presuppositions, Supervaluations, and Free Logic", in K. Lambert (ed.), The Logical Way of Doing Things, New Haven: Yale University Press (1969), pp. 67-91.
  17. "Facts and Tautological Entailments", Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969), pp. 477-487.
  18. "Compactness and Lowenheim-Skolem Proofs in Modal Logic", Logique et Analyse 12 (1969), pp. 167-178.
  19. "On Massey's Explication of Gruenbaum's Conception of Metric", Philosophy of Science36 (1969), pp. 346-353.
  20. "On the Extension of Beth's Semantics of Physical Theories", Philosophy of Science 37 (1970), pp. 325-334.
  21. "Meaning Relations, Possible Objects, and Possible Worlds" (with K. Lambert), in K. Lambert (ed.), Philosophical Problems in Logic (Reidel,1970), pp. l-20.
  22. "Truth and Paradoxical Consequences" in R. Martin (ed.), The Paradox of the Liar(New Haven: Yale University Press 1970), pp. 13-23.
  23. "Rejoinder: On a Kantian Conception of Language", Ibid., pp. 59-66.
  24. "Inference and Self-Reference", Synthese 21 (1970), pp. 425-438.

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(Video) Bas C. van Fraassen - What are Selves?

Articles after 1970

  1. "Probabilities and the Problem of Individuation" in S. Luckenbach (ed.), Probabilities, Problem and Paradoxes (Encino, California: Dickenson 1972),pp. 121-138.
  2. "A Formal Approach to the Philosophy of Science" in R. Colodny (ed.), Paradigms and Paradoxes: The Philosophical Challenge of the Quantum Domain, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972), pp. 303-366.
  3. "The Labyrinth of Quantum Logics", Boston Studies in Philosophy of Science 13(1972), pp. 224-254.
  4. "Earman on The Causal Theory of Time", Synthese 24 (1972), pp. 87-95; also in P.Suppes (ed.), Space, Time and Geometry (Reidel 1973).
  5. "The Logic of Conditional Obligation", Journal Philosophical Logic 1 (1972), pp. 417-438.
  6. "Values and the Heart's Command", Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973), p. 5-19.
  7. "Extension, Intension, and Comprehension", Logic and Ontology, ed. M. Munitz (New York University Press, 1973).
  8. "The Formal Representation of Physical Quantities", Boston Studies in Philosophy of Science 13 (1974), pp. 196-209.
  9. "Putnam on the Corroboration of Theories", The Structure of Scientific Theories, ed. F. Suppe (Urbana: University of Illinois Press 1974), pp.434-436.
  10. "The Einstein-Podolski-Rosen Paradox", Synthese 29 (1974), pp. 291-309.
  11. "Theoretical Entities: The Five Ways", Philosophia 4 (1974), pp. 95-109.
  12. "Bressan and Suppes on Modality" in K.F. Schaffner and R.S. Cohen (eds.), PSA 1972 (Reidel Publishing Co., 1974).
  13. "Semantic Analysis of Quantum Logic", pp. 80-113 in C.A. Hooker (ed.),Contemporary Research in the Foundations and Philosophy ofQuantum Theory(Dordrecht: Reidel, 1973).
  14. "Hidden Variables in Conditional Logic", Theoria 40 (1974), pp. 176-190.
  15. Review: Hide Ishiguro, Leibniz' Philosophy of Logic and Language. Dialogue 13(1974), pp. 185-189.
  16. "Incompleteness Assertion and Belnap Connectives", Contemporary Research in Philosophical Logic and Linguistic Semantics, ed. D.Hockney and W.Harper (Reidel Publishing Co., 1975), pp. 43-70.
  17. "Lakoff's Fuzzy Propositional Logic" (location of 38, pp. 273-278).
  18. "Critical Notice: Hilary Putnam, Philosophy of Logic", Canadian Journal of Philosophy4 (1975), pp. 731-743.
  19. "Theories and Counterfactuals", Action, Knowledge and Reality, ed. H.N. Castaneda (Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1975).
  20. "Platonism's Pyrrhic Victory", in A.L. Anderson, et al. (eds.), The Logical Enterprise(New Haven: Yale University Press 1975), pp. 39-50.
  21. "Probabilities of Conditionals", in W. Harper and C.A. Hooker (eds.) Foundations of Probability and Statistics, Volume l (Reidel, 1975), pp.261-308.
  22. "Wilfrid Sellars on Scientific Realism", Dialogue 14 (1975), pp. 606-616.
  23. "A Semantic Analysis of Bohr's Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics" (jointly with C.A. Hooker) in Harper, W.L. and C.A. Hooker (eds.), Foundations of Probability and Statistics, Volume 3 (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1975), pp. 222-241.
  24. "Report on Conditionals" Teorema 6 (1976), pp. 5-25.
  25. "Representation of Conditional Probabilities", Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (1976),pp. 417-430.
  26. "To Save the Phenomena", Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976), pp. 623-632.
  27. "The Only Necessity is Verbal Necessity", Journal of Philosophy 74 (1977), pp. 71-85.
  28. Review: Wilfred Sellars, Essays in Philosophy and its History, Annals of Science 34 (1977), pp. 73-74.
  29. "The Pragmatics of Explanation", American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1977), pp. 143- 150.
  30. "Relative Frequencies", Synthese 34 (1977), pp. 133-166.
  31. "On the Radical Incompleteness of the Manifest Image (Comments on Sellars)", pp.335- 343 in F. Suppe and P. Asquith, eds., PSA 1976, Volume II(Philosophy of Science Association, East Lansing, 1977), pp. 335-343.
  32. "Essence and Existence", American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph Series No. 12 (1978).
  33. Review: Wolfgang Stegmuller, Personnelle und Statistische Wahrscheinlichkeit", Philosophy of Science 45 (1978), pp. 158-163.
  34. "Time, Physical and Experiential", Epistemologia l (1978), pp. 323-338.
  35. "Foundations of Probability: A Modal Frequency Interpretation", in G. Toraldo diFrancia (ed.), Problems in the Foundations of Physics, pp.344-394. Amsterdam: North- Holland Pub. Co. 1979.
  36. "On Carnap and Popper Probability Functions" (with Hughes Leblanc), Journal ofSymbolic Logic 44 (1979), pp. 369-373.
  37. "Hidden Variables and the Modal Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics", Synthese 42 (1979), pp. 155-165.
  38. "Propositional Attitudes in Weak Pragmatics", Studia Logica 38 (1979), pp. 365-374.
  39. "Modality" in H. Kyburg (ed.), Current Research in Philosophy of Science (Philosophyof Science Association 1979).
  40. "Russell's Philosophical Account of Probability", in G.W. Roberts (ed.), BertrandRussell Memorial Volume (London: Allen and Unwin, 1979), pp.384-413.
  41. "A Temporal Framework for Conditionals and Chance", Philosophical Review 89(1980), pp. 91-108.
  42. "A Re-examination of Aristotle's Philosophy of Science", Dialogue 19 (1980), pp. 20-45.
  43. "Rational Belief and Probability Kinematics", Philosophy of Science, Vol. 47, June1980, pp. 165-187.
  44. "Critical Study: Brian Ellis, Rational Belief Systems", Canadian Journal of Philosophy,10 (1980), 497-511.

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Articles after 1980

  1. "Assumptions and Interpretations of Quantum Logic" in Current Issues in QuantumLogic, (1981) -- see Books, above.
  2. "A Modal Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics" in Current Issues in Quantum Logic (1981).
  3. "Critical Study: Paul Churchland, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind,Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 11 (1981), 555-567.
  4. "Probabilistic Semantics Objectified, I", Journal of Philosophical Logic, 10 (1981), 371- 394; Part II, 10(1981), 495-510.
  5. "Essences and Laws of Nature", in R. Healey (ed.), Reduction, Time and Reality, Cambridge University Press (1981), pp. 189-200.
  6. "Discussion: A Problem for Relative Information Minimizers in ProbabilityKinematics", British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32(1981), 375-379.
  7. "Rational Belief and the Common Cause Principle", 193-209 in R. McLaughlin (ed.),What? Where? When? Why? Essays in honour of Wesley Salmon(Dordrecht: Reidel, 1982).
  8. "The Charybdis of Realism: Epistemological Implications of Bell's Inequality",Synthese 5 (1982), 25-38.
  9. "Quantification as an Act of Mind", Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1982), 343-369.
  10. "Epistemic Semantics Defended", Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1982), 463-464.
  11. "Gentlemen's Wagers: Relevant Logic and Probability" Philosophical Studies 43(1983), 47-61.
  12. "Calibration: A Frequency Justification for Personal Probability", pp. 295-319 in R.S. Cohen and L. Laudan (eds.) Physics, Philosophy, andPsychoanalysis (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1983).
  13. "Theory Confirmation: Tension and Conflict", pp. 319-329 in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the SeventhInternational Wittgenstein Symposium (Vienna: Hoelder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1983).
  14. "Shafer on Conditional Probabilities", Journal of Philosophical Logic 12 (1983), pp.467- 470.
  15. "Sulla realta' degli enti matematici" pp. 90-110 in Proceedings of the Conference on Levels of Reality, Florence 1978: M.Piatelli-Palmerini (ed.) Livelli di Realta'. Milano: Feltrinelli, 1984.
  16. "On Characterizing Popper and Carnap Probability Functions" (with W. L. Harper and H. Leblanc in H. Leblanc, R. Gumb, and R. Stern (eds.) Essays in Epistemology and Semantics. New York: Haven Publications, 1984.
  17. "Theory Comparison and Relevant Evidence" in J. Earman (ed.), Testing Scientific Theories. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol.X. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984.
  18. "Glymour on Evidence and Explanation" same location as 82.
  19. "Belief and the Will" Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 235-256.
  20. "The Problem of Indistinguishable Particles" in J.T. Cushing, C.F. Delaney, G.M.Gutting (eds.) Science and Reality: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Science. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984.
  21. (with R.I.G. Hughes) "Symmetry Arguments in Probability Kinematics" in P. Kitcher and P. Asquith (eds.) PSA 1984, vol. 2, pp. 851-869. East Lansing, Mich.:Philosophy of Science Association, 1985.
  22. "Statistical Behaviour of Indistinguishable Particles" in P. Mittelstaedt and E-W. Stachow (eds.) Recent Developments in Quantum Logic. Zurich,1985.
  23. "Empiricism in the Philosophy of Science" pp. 245-308 in P.M. Churchland and C.A. Hooker (eds.) Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism, with a Reply by Bas C. van Fraassen. University of Chicago Press, 1985.
  24. "Salmon on Explanation", Journal of Philosophy 82 (1985), pp. 639-651.

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(Video) Bas van Fraassen: The Semantic Approach to Science, After 50 Years

Articlesafter 1985

  1. "A Demonstration of the Jeffrey Conditionalization Rule", Erkenntnis 24 (1986), 17-24.
  2. "On the Question of Identification of a Scientific Theory" (Reply to Perez Ransanz), Critica 17 (1985), 21-25.
  3. "EPR: When is a Correlation not a Mystery", pp. 113-128 in P. Lahti and P. Mittelstaedt (eds.) Symposium on the Foundations of Modern Physics: 50 Yearsof the Einstein- Podolsky-Rosen Experiment. Singapore: World Scientific, 1985.
  4. "Aim and Structure of Scientific Theories",pp.397-318 in International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science VII: 1983 (Salzburg)ed. R.B. Marcus, G. Dorn, and P. Weingartner. Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub. Co., 1986.
  5. "Que son las leyes de la naturaleza?", Dianoia 31 (1985), pp. 211-262 (appeared in 1986).
  6. "The World We Speak Of, and the Language We Live In", pp. 213-221 in Philosophyand Culture: Proc. of the XVII-th World Congress of Philosophy(Montreal, 1983). Montreal: Editions du Beffroi, 1986.
  7. "A Problem for Relative Information Minimizers in Probability Kinematics, Continued" with R.I.G. Hughes and G. Harman, British Journal for thePhilosophy of Science 37(1986), 453-475.
  8. "Symmetries in Personal Probability Kinematics" in N. Rescher (ed.) Scientific Inquiry in Philosophical Perspective. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987, pp. 183-224.
  9. "Armstrong on Laws and Probabilities", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 65 (1987), 243-260.
  10. "The Semantic Approach to Scientific Theories" in N.J. Nersessian (ed.) The Process of Science. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987.
  11. "Simmetrie e cinematica della probabilita personale" in M. C. Galavotti and G. Gambetta (eds.), Epistemologica ed Economia. Bologna: CLUEB, 1988, pp. 21-42.
  12. "Identity in Intensional Logic: Subjective Semantics" Versus 44/45 (1986), 201-219 (appeared in 1988).
  13. "The problem of old evidence", pp. 153-165 in David F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1988).
  14. "Symmetry Arguments in Science and Metaphysics", pp. 385-409 in W. Deppert (ed.), Exact Sciences and Their Philosophical Foundations (Frankfurt: Verlag Peter Lang, 1988).
  15. "The Peculiar Effects of Love and Desire", pp. 123-156 in Perspectives on Self-Deception. ed. A. Rorty and B. McLaughlin (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
  16. "Die Pragmatik des Erklaerens", pp. 31-89 in Gerhard Schurz (ed.) Erklaeren und Verstehen (Muenchen: Oldenbourg, 1988) - Part I, pp. 31-56 is new; Part II is a reprint of part of Ch. 5 of The Scientific Image.
  17. "On Explanation in Physics" pp. 109-113 in J. Cushing and E. McMullen, (eds.), The Philosophical Consequences of Quantum Mechanics, University of Notre Dame Press, 1989. Printed as Appendix to a reprint of "The Charybdis of Realism" (#74 above).
  18. "Probabilities in physics: an empiricist view", pp. 339-347 in P. Weingartner and G. Schurz (eds.) Philosophy of the Natural Sciences, Vienna: Hoelder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1989 (proceedings of the XIIIth Wittgenstein Conference, Kirchberg 1988).
  19. "Figures in a Probability Landscape", pp. 345-356 in Dunn, M.and Gupta, A. (eds.) Truth or Consequences. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990.
  20. Review of W. V. O. Quine, Pursuit of Truth. Times Literary Supplement, August 10-16, 1990.

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Articles after 1990

  1. "Time in physical and narrative structure", pp. 19-37 in J.Bender and D. E. Wellbery (eds.) Chronotypes: The Construction of Time. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991.
  2. "The modal interpretation of quantum mechanics", pp. 440-460 in P. Lahti and P. Mittelstaedt (eds.), Symposium on the Foundations of Modern Physics 1990. Singapore: World Publishing Co. 1991.
  3. "The problem of measurement in quantum mechanics", pp. 497-503 in P. Lahti and P. Mittelstaedt (eds.), Symposium on the Foundations of Modern Physics 1990. Singapore: World Publishing Co. 1991.
  4. "On (Ix)(x = Lambert)" in W. Spohn, B. van Fraassen, and Brian Skyrms (eds.) Existence and Explanation. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991, pp. 1-18.
  5. "Jeffrey Shifts and Self-Adjoint Operators", Philosophy of Science 59 (1992),163-175.
  6. "La credenza e il problema di Ulisse e le Sirene", pp. 77-106 in A. E. Galeotti (ed.) Individui e Istituzioni. Torino: La Rosa Editrice, 1992.
  7. "La Meccanica Quantistica: uno spettro di interpretazioni", Iride 7 (1991), 28-50.
  8. "Faire figure dans un monde probabiliste" (translation of a modified version of #108), 307- 322 in Daniel Laurier and Francois Lepage (eds.), Essais sur le Langage et l'Intentionalite'. Montreal: Bellarmin, 1992; Paris: Vrin, 1992.
  9. "Three-sided scholarship: Comments on the paper of John R. Donahue, S.J.", pp. 315-325 in E. Stump and T. P. Flint (eds.), Hermes and Athena: Biblical Exegesis and Philosophical Theology. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993.
  10. "Despues del fundacionismo: entre el carculo vicioso y el regresso al infinito", Di&noia 38 (1992), 217-240. ("After foundationalism: between vicious circle and infinite regress", Proceedings of the XI Simposio de Filosofaa del Instituto de Investigaciones Filos 1992.) [note: this appeared in 1993; it overlaps 3/4 of item 124.]
  11. "Armstrong, Cartwright, and Earman on Laws and Symmetry", Phenomenology and Philosophical Research, 53 (1993), 431-444.
  12. "Interpretation in Science and in the Arts" (with Jill Sigman ), pp. 73-99 in G. Levine (ed.) Realism and Representation. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993.
  13. "From vicious circle to infinite regress, and back again"; pp. 6-29 in D. Hull, M.Forbes, and K. Ohkruhlik (eds.) PSA 1992, Vol. 2 (proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association Conference, Nov. 1992) Northwestern University Press, 1993.
  14. "Gideon Rosen on constructive empiricism", Philos. Studies 74 (1994), 179-192.
  15. "Against Transcendental Empiricism", in T. J. Stapledon (ed.) The Question of Hermeneutics. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994.
  16. "The World of Empiricism", pp. 114-134 in Jan Hilgevoort (ed.) Physics and Our View of the World. Cambridge University Press, 1994.
  17. "Interpretation of science: science as interpretation", pp. 169-187 in Jan Hilgevoort (ed.) Physics and Our View of the World. Cambridge University Press, 1994.
  18. "Interpretation of QM: Parallels and Choices", pp. 7-14 in L. Accardi (ed.) The Interpretation of Quantum Theory: Where Do We Stand?. Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana (distributed Fordham University Press), 1994.

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(Video) Voluntarist Epistemology

Articles from 1995 on

  1. "Belief and the problem of Ulysses and the Sirens", Philos. Studies 77 (1995), 7-37 (this paper overlaps published item 117).
  2. "A philosophical approach to the foundations of science", Foundations of Science 1 (1995/96), 5-9.
  3. Little review of S. Shapin, A Social History of Truth, Common Knowledge 4 (1995), 81-82.
  4. "Against Naturalized Empiricism", pp. 68-88 in P. Leonardi and M. Santambrogio (eds.) On Quine. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1995.
  5. "Fine-grained opinion, probability, and the logic of belief", Journal of Philosophical Logic, 24 (1995), 349-377.
  6. "'World' is not a count noun", Nous 29 (1995), 139-157.
  7. "Science, probability, and the proposition", PSA94, vol. 2, pp. 339-348. East Lansing,MI: Philosophy of Science Association, 1995.
  8. "Science, Materialism, and False Consciousness", pp. 149-181 in Jonathan Kvanvig (ed.) Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Alvin Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge. Rowman Littlefield, 1996.
  9. "Structure and perspective: philosophical perplexity and paradox", pp. 511-530 in M. L. Dalla Chiara et al. (eds.) Logic and Scientific Methods. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997.
  10. "Elgin on Lewis' Putnam's Paradox", Journal of Philosophy 94 (1997), 85-93.
  11. "Probabilite' conditionelle et certitude" (revised version of ."Fine-grained opinion, conditional probability, and the logic of belief", 1995), Dialogue 36 (1997), 69-90.
  12. "Comments on Peter Roeper's 'The link between probability functions and logical consequence", Dialogue 36 (1997), 27-31.
  13. (with James Ladyman, Igor Douven, and Leon Horsten) "A Defence of van Fraassen's Critique of Abductive Reasoning: Reply to Psillos", Philosophical Quarterly 47 (1997), 305-321.
  14. "Putnam's Paradox: Metaphysical Realism Revamped and Evaded", Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 11 (Boston: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 17-42.
  15. "Modal interpretation of repeated measurement: reply to Leeds and Healey", Philosophy of Science 64 (1997), 669-676.
  16. "Sola experientia? Feyerabend's Refutation of Classical Empiricism", Philosophy of Science 64 (1997), S385-S395.
  17. "Frequency and the Myth of Probability", pp. 55-67 in H. Poser and U. Dirks, Hans Reichenbach: Philosophie im Umkreis der Physik. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1998.
  18. "The agnostic subtly probabilified", Analysis 58 (1998), 212-220.
  19. Review: J. Bub, Interpreting the Quantum World. Foundations of Physics 28 (1998), 683-689.
  20. "Response: Haldane on the future of philosophy", New Blackfriars 80 (1999), 177-181.
  21. "The Manifest Image and the Scientific Image", pp. 29-52 in D. Aerts (ed.). Einstein Meets Magritte: The White Book -- An Interdisciplinary Reflection. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999.
  22. "Conditionalization, A New Argument For", Topoi 18 (1999), 93-96.

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Articles from 2000 on

  1. "The False Hopes of Traditional Epistemology", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000), 253-280.
  2. "The theory of tragedy and of science: does nature have narrative structure?" pp. 31-59 in D. Sfendoni-Mentzou (ed.) Aristotle and Contemporary Science, vol 1. New York: Peter Lang, 2000.
  3. "How is scientific revolution/conversion possible?", Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 73 (1999 -- appeared in 2000), 63-80.
  4. "The sham victory of abstraction" (Review of Feyerabend, Conquest of Abundance), Times Literary Supplement 5073: June 23, 2000, 10-11.
  5. "La fin de l'empirisme?" Revue Philosophiquede Louvain 98 (2000), 449-479.
  6. "Michel Ghins on the empirical vs. thetheoretical", Foundations of Science 30 (2000), 1655-1661.
  7. "Constructive Empiricism Now", Philosophical Studies 106 (2001), 151-170.
  8. "Literate Experience: The [De-, Re-] Interpretation of Nature&quot, Versus 85/86/87 (2000), 331-358 (published in 2002).
  9. "On McMullin's Appreciation of Realism Concerning the Sciences"", Philosophy of Science 70 (2003), 479-492.
  10. "Constructive Empiricism and Modal Nominalism " (with Bradley Monton), British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 54 (2003), pp. 405-422.
  11. "Symmetry as a guide to superfluous theoretical structure" (with Jenann Ismael), in Symmetries in Physics: Philosophical Reflections. Ed. Katherine Brading and Elena Castellani. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
  12. "Transcendence of the Ego: The Non-Existent Knight", Ratio (new series) XVII (2004), 453-477.
  13. "Précis" and "Replies" in book symposium on The Empirical Stance. Philosophical Studies 121 (2004), 127-132 and 171-192.
  14. "Science as Representation: Flouting the Criteria", Philosophy of Science 71 (2004), 794-804.

    Articles from 2005 on

  15. "Conditionalizing on violated Bell's inequalities", Analysis 65.1 (Jan 2005), pp. 27-32.
  16. “Appearance versus Reality as a Scientific Problem”, Philosophic Exchange 35 (2005), 34-67.
  17. "The Day of the Dolphins: Puzzling Over Epistemic Partnership", pp. 111- 133 in A. Irvine and K. Peacock, eds., Mistakes of Reason: Essays in Honour of John Woods. University of Tororonto Press, 2005.
  18. “Vague Expectation Loss”, Philosophical Studies 127 (2006), 483–491.
  19. “Weyl’s paradox: the distance between structure and perspective”, pp. 13-34 in Andreas Berg-Hildebrand and Christian Suhm (eds.), Bas C. van Fraassen: The Fortunes of Empiricism. Frankfurt: ontos verlag, 2006.
  20. “Replies”, pp. 125-171 in ibid.
  21. “One Hundred and Fifty Years of Philosophy”, Topoi 2006, 123-127.
  22. «Le Fictionalisme des Entités Inobservables » in Science et Avenir,Hors-Série : Les fictions de la science, n°147, juillet/août 2006.
  23. “Structure: its Shadow and Substance”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2006), 275-307.
  24. "Le quasi-réalisme de Schrödinger". Review of M. Bitbol, Schrödinger's Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics. Science et Avenir,Hors-Série 148 (Oct/Nov 2006), p. 80.
  25. “Structuralism(s) About Science: Some Common Problems”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian SocietySupplementary Volume LXXXI (2007), pp. 45-61.
  26. “Representation: the Problem for Structuralism”, Philosophy of Science 73 (2006), pp. 536-547.
  27. “The Constitutive A Priori” Review of Ryckman, The Reign of Relativity. Metascience 16 (2007), pp. 407-419.
  28. “REPLY: From a view of science to a new empiricism” in Bradley Monton (ed.), Images of Empiricism: Essays on Science and Stances, with a Reply from Bas van Fraassen. Oxford University Press, 2007.
  29. “Identity over Time: Objectively, Subjectively”, with I. Peschard. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2008), pp. 15-35.
  30. “How to Talk about Unobservables” (with F. A. Muller), Analysis 68 (2008), 197–205.
  31. “Representation and Perspective in Science”. Principia 11(2007), 97-116.
  32. “Identity over Time: Objectively, Subjectively”, with I. Peschard. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2008), pp. 15-35.
  33. “How to Talk about Unobservables” (with F. A. Muller), Analysis 68 (2008), 197–205.
  34. “Sloughs Of Despond, Mountains Of Joy” Critical Quarterly 50: 4 (Dec. 2008) , 74-87.
  35. Review: Graham Oppy, Philosophical Perspectives on Infinity. International Philosophical Quarterly 48/2 (June 2008), pages 257-258.
  36. “Rescher on Explanation and Prediction”, in Robert Almeder (Ed.) Rescher Studies: A Collection of Essays on the Philosophical Work of Nicholas Rescher Presented to Him on the Occasion of His 80th Birthday. Ontos Verlag, 2009.
  37. Review: Talal A. Debs and Michael G. Redhead, Objectivity, Invariance, and Convention: Symmetry in Physical Science. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 40 (2009): 84–87
  38. “The Perils of Perrin, at the hands of philosophers” Philosophical Studies 143 (2009): 5-24.
  39. “Can empiricism leave its realism behind?” pp. 457-480 in Michel Bitbol, Pierre Kerszberg, and Jean Petitot (eds.) Constituting Objectivity: Transcendental Approaches Of Modern Physics. Springer Pub Co. 2009.
  40. "The Representation of Nature in Physics: A Reflection on Adolf Grünbaum's Early Writings", pp. 305-349 in Jokic, A. (ed.) Philosophy of Physics and Psychology: Essays in Honor of Adolf Grünbaum. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2009.

    Articles from 2010 on

  41. “Rovelli’s World”. Foundations of Physics 40 (2010): 390-418.
  42. “Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective (Precis)”, Analysis 70 (2010) : 511-514.
  43. “Reply to Contessa, Ghins, and Healey”, Analysis 70 (2010): 547-556.
  44. “Precis of Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective” Philosophical Studies 150 (2010): 425-428.
  45. “Reply to Belot, Elgin, and Horsten” Philosophical Studies 150 (2010): 461-472.
  46. “On Stance and Rationality”. (Reply to contributors) Synthese 178 (2011): 155-169.
  47. “Thomason's paradox for belief, and two consequence relations”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2011):15–32.
  48. “What Was Perrin’s Real Achievement?” pp. 231-246 (with reply by Achinstein pp. 294-296) in Gregory Morgan (ed.) Philosophy of Science Matters: The Philosophy of Peter Achinstein. Oxford University Press 2011

FORTHCOMING (these entries updated June 2011) (indexed by year it was accepted for publication)

(Video) Bas van Fraassen: The Self, From a Logical Point of View

  • 2010. “A Long Journey from Pragmatics to Pragmatics” (Reply to Bueno, Ladyman, and Suarez), forthcoming in Metascience.
  • 2010. “Logic and the Philosophy of Science”, Forthcoming: Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 27 (2011), #2
  • 2010. Contribution to book symposium “The physics and metaphysics of identity and individuality” for S. French and D. Krause, Identity in physics. Forthcoming in Metascience.

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(Video) Grünbaum Memorial May 11 2019


What is explanation in science according to Van Fraassen? ›

Although van Fraassen's theory of explanation is based on the view that explanation is a process of communication, he still chooses to explicate the concept of explanation as a logical relationship between question and answer, rather than as a communicative relationship between two individuals.

What makes a theory adequate? ›

Roughly speaking, the theory is empirically adequate if the observable phenomena can “find a home” within the structures described by the theory—that is to say, the observable phenomena can be “embedded” in the theory.

Is constructive empiricism anti realism? ›

Constructive empiricism opposes scientific realism, logical positivism (or logical empiricism) and instrumentalism. Constructive empiricism and scientific realism agree that theories are semantically literal, which logical positivism and instrumentalism deny.

Is empiricism the same as constructivism? ›

The empiricist aspect is contained in the negation of the synthetic a priori when understood in terms of necessary and universal validity. The constructivist aspect consists in acknowledging the crucial cognitive role of principles that are produced by human thinking.

What does Bas Van Fraassen think we should meant by the phrase accepting a scientific theory? ›

Van Fraassen defines scientific realism as follows: 'Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like; and acceptance. of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true' ([1980], p.

What is theory short answer? ›

In everyday use, the word "theory" often means an untested hunch, or a guess without supporting evidence. But for scientists, a theory has nearly the opposite meaning. A theory is a well-substantiated explanation of an aspect of the natural world that can incorporate laws, hypotheses and facts.

What makes a theory accepted or not accepted? ›

A theory is said to be accepted if it is taken as the best available description of its object. A theory is said to be accepted if it is taken as the best available description or prescription of its object.

What is the main purpose of theory? ›

Theories are formulated to explain, predict, and understand phenomena and, in many cases, to challenge and extend existing knowledge, within the limits of the critical bounding assumptions. The theoretical framework is the structure that can hold or support a theory of a research study.

What is the main point of the theory? ›

Theory provides concepts to name what we observe and to explain relationships between concepts. Theory allows us to explain what we see and to figure out how to bring about change.

Why is Kant against empiricism? ›

Kant responded to his predecessors by arguing against the Empiricists that the mind is not a blank slate that is written upon by the empirical world, and by rejecting the Rationalists' notion that pure, a priori knowledge of a mind-independent world was possible.

What are the 4 styles of anti-realism? ›

In contemporary philosophy, anti-realism was revived in the form of empirio-criticism, logical positivism, semantic anti-realism and scientific instrumentalism (see below).

Is Nietzsche anti-realist? ›

Because Nietzsche, however, is an anti-realist about value, he takes neither his positive vision, nor those aspects of his critique that depend upon it, to have any special epistemic status, a fact which helps explain his rhetoric and the circumspect character of his “esoteric” moralizing.

Is constructivism and constructivism the same? ›

Constructivism highlights the interests and abilities of children to achieve specific educational goals at different ages. Constructionism, on the other hand, focuses on the manner of learning. This highlights that these two theories are different from one another.

What is the main concept of constructivism theory? ›

Constructivism is the theory that says learners construct knowledge rather than just passively take in information. As people experience the world and reflect upon those experiences, they build their own representations and incorporate new information into their pre-existing knowledge (schemas).

What is the conclusion of the underdetermination argument? ›

The underdetermination thesis says that all evidence necessarily underdetermines any scientific theory. Underdetermination exists when available evidence is insufficient to identify which belief one should hold about that evidence.

What is a scientific theory choose the best answer? ›

A scientific theory is a structured explanation to explain a group of facts or phenomena in the natural world that often incorporates a scientific hypothesis and scientific laws.

Why is the scientific theory so important? ›

Scientific theories provide organizing principles and construct objectivity by framing observations and experiments. Even research performed within the frame of one “wrong” theory sooner or later will result in the demise of such a theory, thus advancing our knowledge.

What are the 3 types of theory? ›

Although there are many different approaches to learning, there are three basic types of learning theory: behaviorist, cognitive constructivist, and social constructivist.

What questions does theory attempt answer? ›

A theory is a method we use to give us understanding. One of the major purposes of a theory is to provide an answer to the question 'why? '. Asking, 'why?

What are 3 examples of theories? ›

Examples of scientific theories in different areas of science include: Astronomy: Big Bang Theory. Biology: Cell Theory; Theory of Evolution; Germ Theory of Disease. Chemistry: Atomic Theory; Kinetic Theory of Gases.

What theory is the most accepted? ›

The most widely accepted explanation is the big bang theory. Learn about the explosion that started it all and how the universe grew from the size of an atom to encompass everything in existence today.

How is a theory rejected? ›

A theory becomes rejected only when other theories that are incompatible with the theory become accepted.

Can a theory ever be proven? ›

Like all knowledge in science, no theory can ever be completely certain, since it is possible that future experiments might conflict with the theory's predictions.

What are the 3 purposes of theory? ›

Theories are formulated to explain, predict, and understand phenomena and, in many cases, to challenge and extend existing knowledge within the limits of critical bounding assumptions.

What is the original meaning of theory? ›

It comes from the Greek theorin, which means “to look at” or “to observe” or “to speculate.” That term comes, in turn, from the Greek theoros, “a spectator,” which comes from thea, meaning “theater.” Perhaps this connection to the theater is part of the reason the word theory is sometimes used to suggest that something ...

What are the 4 goals of theory? ›

To sum up, psychology is centered on four major goals: to describe, explain, predict, and change or control behaviors. These goals are the foundation of most theories and studies in an attempt to understand the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral processes that people face in their daily lives.

Is theory a fact? ›

In science, theories never become facts. Rather, theories explain facts. The third misconception is that scientific research provides proof in the sense of attaining the absolute truth. Scientific knowledge is always tentative and subject to revision should new evidence come to light.

What would happen if we solved the theory of everything? ›

A theory of everything would not bring us much closer to understanding large-scale emergent phenomena like life, consciousness, or superconductivity. In fact, most fields of science — biology, chemistry, geology, and so on — would be almost completely unaffected.

Why is theory important in teaching? ›

Educational theory, including theories of learning and theories of instruction, provides explanations about the underlying mechanisms involved in learning and teaching. Such theories tell us why and under what circumstances certain learning strategies and teaching methods work, while others do not.

Why is Kant's theory flawed? ›

The most common and general criticisms are that, because it concentrates on principles or rules, Kantian ethics is doomed to be either empty and formalistic or rigidly uniform in its prescriptions (the complaints cannot both be true).

What is the famous line of Immanuel Kant? ›

All our knowledge begins with the senses, proceeds then to the understanding, and ends with reason. There is nothing higher than reason.

Why is Kant's theory better than utilitarianism? ›

It is easier to determine an action as morally right in Kantian ethics than in utilitarian ethics. When data is scarce, Kantian theory offers more precision than utilitarianism because one can generally determine if somebody is being used as a mere means, even if the impact on human happiness is ambiguous.

What are the 3 basic assumptions of realism? ›

Anarchy: the international political system is anarchic, as there is no supranational authority to enforce rules; Rationality and/or egoism: states act in their rational self-interest within the international system; and. Power: states desire power to ensure self-preservation.

What are the 5 key assumptions of realism? ›

Mearsheimer outlines five “bedrock” assumptions on which offensive realism stands: (1) the international system is anarchic; (2) great powers inherently possess some offensive military capability; (3) states can never be certain about the intentions of other states; (4) survival is the primary goal of great powers; and ...

What are the three S's of realism? ›

At its core, political realism is guided by three S's: statism, survival, and self-help.

Was Nietzsche LGBT? ›

So it should be unsurprising that no direct evidence of Nietzsche's homosexuality emerges. Still, some skepticism remains: there is no specific person with whom Köhler claims unambiguously that Nietzsche had a homosexual relationship, or with whom he longed to have one.

What religion did Nietzsche believe in? ›

Nietzsche views Dionysian pantheism as a solution to the problems of pain and death, and argues for the flourishing of a new 'festival,' based on a humanity-affirming religion modeled on that of the ancient Greeks.

Did Nietzsche ever believe in God? ›

Nietzsche was an atheist for his adult life and so he didn't mean that there was a God who had actually died, but rather that our idea of one had. After the Enlightenment, the idea of a universe that was governed by physical laws and not by divine providence had become mainstream.

What's the opposite of constructivism? ›

Constructivism is often compared to objectivism, which is usually quoted as being the counter point or direct opposite of constructivism. Much of objectivist theory is based on the work of behaviorists such as Skinner (1954.)

What is a good example of constructivism? ›

Example: An elementary school teacher presents a class problem to measure the length of the "Mayflower." Rather than starting the problem by introducing the ruler, the teacher allows students to reflect and to construct their own methods of measurement.

Who is the father of constructivism? ›

Jean Piaget (1896-1980) is considered the father of the constructivist view of learning.

What are the 5 methods of teaching? ›

Here are five strategies that proved to be extremely effective in my classroom.
  • Student-Centered Discussions. ...
  • Making Connections. ...
  • Increased Autonomy. ...
  • Building Relationships. ...
  • A Focus on Literacy.

What are 2 key concepts in constructivist theory? ›

1) we have to focus on the learner in thinking about learning (not on the subject/lesson to be taught): 2) There is no knowledge independent of the meaning attributed to experience (constructed) by the learner, or community of learners.

What are the three important points of constructivism? ›

1) To provide experience with the knowledge construction process (students determine how they will learn). 2) To provide experience in and appreciation for multiple perspectives (evaluation of alternative solutions). 3) To embed learning in realistic contexts (authentic tasks).

What is the main criticism of constructivism? ›

Perhaps the most substantive criticism of constructivism is that as a theory of learning, it has little to say about teaching beyond the requirement to ascertain students' prior knowledge.

What are the key elements of constructivism? ›

The authors describe six elements, each representing an important process in moving constructivist learning theory into classroom practice: Situation, Groupings, Bridge, Questions, Exhibit, and Reflections.

What are the benefits of using constructivism to teaching and learning? ›

Constructivism promotes social and communication skills by creating a classroom environment that emphasizes collaboration and exchange of ideas. Students must learn how to articulate their ideas clearly as well as to collaborate on tasks effectively by sharing in group projects.

What is a scientific explanation according to Hempel? ›

A scientific explanation of a fact is a deduction of a statement (called the explanandum) that describes the fact we want to explain; the premises (called the explanans) are scientific laws and suitable initial conditions. For an explanation to be acceptable, the explanans must be true.

What is scientific explanation philosophy? ›

According to the Deductive-Nomological Model, a scientific explanation consists of two major “constituents”: an explanandum, which is a sentence “describing the phenomenon to be explained” and an explanans, “the class of those sentences which are adduced to account for the phenomenon” (Hempel & Oppenheim 1948 [1965: ...

What is the best explanation of the term theory as used in science? ›

A theory is a carefully thought-out explanation for observations of the natural world that has been constructed using the scientific method, and which brings together many facts and hypotheses.

What is science according to Kari Popper? ›

According to Popper, scientific theory should make predictions which can be tested, and the theory rejected if these predictions are shown not to be correct. He argued that science would best progress using deductive reasoning as its primary emphasis, known as critical rationalism.

What are the 3 types of explanation? ›

this muddled circumstance on explanations in science classroom, Treagust and Harrison (2000) made the first clarification by attributing the explanations in science classroom into three categories: folk explanation, instructional explanation, and scientific explanation (Fig.

What is the significance of Semmelweis case for Hempel and his theory of explanation? ›

The historical account of Semmelweis provided an impetus for Hempel to ponder upon the role of “induction” in “scientific inquiry.” By considering various conjectures, he examined through this case, how a hypothesis once proposed is tested and rejected on the basis of test implication.

What is the best explanation argument? ›

Inference to the best explanation is a form of inductive argument whose premises are a set of observed facts, a hypothesis that explains those observed facts, and a comparison of competing explanations, and whose conclusion is that the hypothesis is true.

What are the 3 concepts of philosophy? ›

Explain and differentiate three main areas of philosophy: ethics, epistemology and metaphysics.

What are the 5 concepts of philosophy? ›

Abstract. The book provides an introduction to six fundamental philosophy concepts - philosophy, language, knowledge, truth, being and good.

What are the 3 philosophical methods? ›

The purpose of this article is to examine the study of spirituality from the perspective of 3 philosophical paradigms: empiricism, interpretivism, and poststructuralism.

What is the best definition of the term theory as it used in sentence? ›

: a belief, policy, or procedure proposed or followed as the basis of action. her method is based on the theory that all children want to learn. : an ideal or hypothetical set of facts, principles, or circumstances. often used in the phrase in theory. in theory, we have always advocated freedom for all.

What is the most accepted theory in science? ›

Big Bang theory is the most accepted theory to explain the origin of universe.

What is the difference between Popper and Kuhn? ›

Abstract. Popper repeatedly emphasised the significance of a critical attitude, and a related critical method, for scientists. Kuhn, however, thought that unquestioning adherence to the theories of the day is proper; at least for 'normal scientists'.

How does Popper explain the growth of human knowledge? ›

For Popper, the growth of human knowledge proceeds from our problems and from our attempts to solve them. These attempts involve the formulation of theories which must go beyond existing knowledge and therefore require a leap of the imagination.

Was Popper a Marxist? ›

Popper's rejection of Marxism during his teenage years left a profound mark on his thought. He had at one point joined a socialist association, and for a few months in 1919 considered himself a communist.


1. Science, Scientism, and the Public Good: Lecture 2
(Bloomsbury Publishing)
2. Does Metaphysics Reveal Reality? | Episode 908 | Closer To Truth
(Closer To Truth)
(Critical Realism Network Asia Pacific)
4. Daniel Dennett - What is the Nature of Personal Identity?
(Closer To Truth)
5. Tips for distinguishing between a book and an article
(InfoTrack UNIGE)
6. Christian philosophy | Wikipedia audio article
(wikipedia tts)

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